ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
he United States Constitution clearly provides for the separation of federal powers among Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches. Administrative agencies typically combine in one entity the functions associated with the three Constitutional branches of government. Administrative agencies make, enforce, and adjudicate legislative or substantive rules that are as legally binding as laws that Congress passed. Administrative agencies are sometimes referred to as the "fourth branch" of the U.S. government. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) establishes a process for administrative agencies that includes three functions:

Legislative -Rulemaking is the formulation of new regulation. Rulemaking is conducted pursuant to procedures established by the APA. Rulemaking follows a "Notice and Comment" process that involves four steps: Note that the APA also provides that it is the agency itself that is the final decision maker, and has discretion and latitude in overruling the ALJ (Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 1951) .
Article I of the Constitution has been held to authorize delegating such powers to administrative agencies. This apparent violation of the separation of powers principles is generally permitted so long as Administrative law has been defined as that branch of the law dealing with the organization, powers and duties of administrative agencies, the legal requirements governing their operation, and the remedies available to those adversely affected by administrative action. In the Anglo-American legal system, administrative law concerns itself with the delegation of legislative and judicial powers to the Executive Branch, the manner in which such powers may be exercised, and judicial control of the administrative agency. (Darity, 2008)
CRITICISMS
The rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication processes associated with administrative agencies have all been criticized on various grounds. Criticisms in each area may be summarized as follows:
Rulemaking
The delegation of rulemaking powers from Congress to an administrative agency under the Executive Branch has been criticized on several grounds:

Delegation breeds political irresponsibility by allowing Congress to claim credit for the benefits it provides without being held accountable for the accompanying costs.  Delegation creates a process where special interests and their lobbyists are represented in great strength, while the general public is essentially without representation.  Delegation breed an increasingly large and expensive and potentially unaffordable government.
Defenders of delegation have sought to make the following arguments to offset those claims:
Congress is too busy to vote on detailed policies and procedures.  A complex world requires complex rules, and therefore rulemaking must be the province of experts.
Enforcement
The enforcement power is probably the least subject to structural criticism, primarily because agencies reside in the Executive Branch and enforcement is constitutionally the responsibility of the Executive Branch, so the separation of powers issues do not really apply to this function. Criticisms do include the following:

Enforcement and rulemaking functions are largely performed by the same staff personnel, resulting in some blurring of lines between the two functions.  The problem of the "revolving door," where agency staff personnel are hired by entities subject to regulation by the agency, or legal or consulting firms employed by such entities, cannot be prevented completely, and existing rules regarding cooling off periods are inadequate to ensure complete lack of conflicts of interest. This conflict of interest criticism can be extended further when staff personnel take positions as Administrative Law Judges. 
The agency staffs are fertile ground for the influence of lobbyists, particularly because so many agency proceedings receive far less scrutiny than do congressional proceedings.  Agency staffs may exercise a degree of favoritism, as there is no real accountability to voters.
Adjudication
Kenneth Davis, author of the Administrative Law Treatise, has estimated that federal administrative "trials" outnumber federal court trials by a ratio of more than 6 to 1 and that up to 93 percent of all disputes are resolved in http://www.cluteinstitute.com/ 2013 The Clute Institute federal agency settings rather than in federal court settings. Thus, the sanctity of a citizen's rights rests largely on the justice of administrative procedures (Bovard 1999 ).
The General Accounting Office reported in 1992 that administrative law judges in six federal agencies believed that the agency had attempted to "compromise their independence." One administrative law judge at the Interior Department told the ABA Journal: "We do operate in a wholly vindictive and retaliatory environment." Edward Slavin of the Government Accountability Project in Washington, D.C., observed, "Rather than having the independence of a district court judge, administrative law judges [ALJs] are essentially on the payroll and subjected to the pressure of the agencies." Rep. Barney Frank observed in 1990, "We have gotten allegations from administrative law judges of coercion, threatened transfers, and other kinds of pressures." Yet citizens are forced to spend months or years slogging through these systems as if they were real judicial systems (Bovard 1999 ).
The Labor Department's Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) routinely demands that private companies pay millions of dollars in back wages to people never hired by the company, on grounds that federal judges might likely reject. According to former OFCCP director Ellen Shong Bergman, OFCCP officers are sometimes guilty of "attempted extortion" in their threats against businesses that fail to hire and promote sufficient numbers of minorities and women. Before a federal contractor can get access to a federal judge to rule on the legality of the OFCCP's demands, the company must spend three or more years exhausting the Labor Department appeals processes and hearings before Labor Department ALJs. Even if an ALJ finds against the agency, the political appointees on the board can simply overturn the ALJ's decision (Bovard 1999) .
PROPOSALS
This paper examines several possible approaches:

Requiring Congressional approval and ratification of new agency rulemaking within a reasonable period of time before such rules can take effect, as above; and/or  Implementing a sunset provision requiring that Congress approve and ratify existing rules on a ten-year cycle; and/or  Moving the Administrative Law tribunals out of the individual agencies and into a separate and at least quasi-independent office of administrative hearings, as several states have done; or  Creating new Article III courts within the Judicial Branch, to specialize in administrative law, as is common in continental Europe.
These proposals incorporate 1) processes that have worked at the state level in the US, and 2) approaches that have worked in foreign jurisdictions.
Congressional Approval and Ratification of New Agency Rulemaking
A number of members of Congress have proposed legislation to require Congressional approval and ratification of agency rulemaking before rules can take effect. These efforts have met with mixed success so far.
For example, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha (1983) the Supreme Court majority of five justices, with one concurring, held that a veto by one house of an agency action was unconstitutional because Congress cannot grant itself a legislative veto inconsistent with the bicameralism principle and the Presentment Clause. Justice Powell, concurring, wrote that the legislative veto was essential to controlling the Executive Branch, but that a one-house veto was still unconstitutional. Justice White, dissenting, argued that the veto power was absolutely necessary to modern government.
In order to focus such approval process on the most significant new rules, such a provision could be made subject to some de minimis standard. For example, the Florida Administrative Procedure Act provides that if an agency rule is likely 1) to have an adverse impact on economic growth in excess of $1 million within 5 years, 2) to have an adverse impact on business competitiveness in excess of $1 million within 5 years, or 3) to increase regulatory costs in excess of $1 million in within 5 years, then the rule must be ratified by the Legislature before it can take effect. Specific exemptions exist for emergency rules, rules adopting federal standards, and other specified cases (Joint Administrative Procedures Committee, 2010, p. 8).
Congressional Sunset Review
Sunset provisions provide that a particular agency, law, or regulation will expire on a certain date unless reauthorized by the legislative body. A number of states have adopted sunset review provisions requiring that administrative agencies be subject to review by an independent body on a periodic basis, and required at the time of such review to justify their continued existence, or be terminated. For example, under the Texas sunset provision established in 1977, all agencies-except universities, courts, and agencies established by the state constitution-are abolished after the passage of a specific period of time-typically 12 years-unless the state legislature specifically authorizes their continued existence and functioning. A 12-member panel-consisting of the Lieutenant Governor, five members of the House of Representatives, five members of the Senate, and one public member appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives-oversees the sunset provisions. Each agency performs a self-review, which is submitted to the panel, which then reviews the self-reported data, conducts additional procedures as it deems necessary, and makes a recommendation to the legislature. About 20 to 30 agencies go through the process each biennial legislative session (Texas Sunset Advisory Commission, 2012).
A federal sunset review process could include two components:

A review of agencies on a periodic basis, and  A review of rules issued by the agency, subject to the same de minimis standard adopted for new rules.
Federal Office of Administrative Hearings
Several states have separated the administrative law courts from the other functions of the agency. One indication that this is not a partisan issue is that states whose viewpoints on issues differ as much as Texas and Oregon have both adopted this approach. This approach breaks the link between the ALJ and the executive director of the agency. It does retain the issue of judicial action being taken within the Executive Branch.
Article III Administrative Law Courts
Civil law countries generally have a broader concept of administrative law. They typically have a separate system of administrative law courts. For example,

In France most administrative law disputes are resolved through a system of administrative courts with the Conseil d'Etat (State Council) as the court of last resort. In addition to the areas of administrative law addressed in common-law jurisdictions, administrative law also includes the various forms of administrative agencies (what the French call the "subjects of rights" in administrative law), the exercise of and limits on administrative regulatory power, civil service law, acquisition and management of property by the government, public works, and the obligations of the government, including contract, quasi-contract, and tort (Darity 2008 Obviously, should the agency dispose of the matter in a way contrary to the recommendation of the court, the citizen or citizens would potentially have a very strong case on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The federal administrative law process violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers. This has been allowed to stand historically in order to promote efficiency and equity in carrying out the will of Congress as expressed in the enabling legislation for each agency. Proposals have been made to change this by requiring congressional ratification of agency rules and regulations. Other changes which merit consideration include imposing a sunset review of existing rules and regulations, and moving the administrative law courts out of the agencies themselves, into either a separate office in the Executive Branch or to the Judicial Branch, in order to avoid at least the appearance of potential bias in favor of the agency. 
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